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Efficient Computations of a Security Index for False Data Attacks in
Power Networks
Julien M. Hendrickx, Karl Henrik Johansson, Raphael M. Jungers, Henrik Sandberg and Kin Cheong Sou
Abstract—The resilience of Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for electric power networks for
certain cyber-attacks is considered. We analyze the vulnerability
of the measurement system to false data attack on communicated
measurements. The vulnerability analysis problem is shown to be
NP-hard, meaning that unless P=NP there is no polynomial time
algorithm to analyze the vulnerability of the system. Nevertheless,
we identify situations, such as the full measurement case, where
it can be solved efficiently. In such cases, we show indeed that
the problem can be cast as a generalization of the minimum cut
problem involving costly nodes. We further show that it can be
reformulated as a standard minimum cut problem (without costly
nodes) on a modified graph of proportional size. An important
consequence of this result is that our approach provides the
first exact efficient algorithm for the vulnerability analysis
problem under the full measurement assumption. Furthermore,
our approach also provides an efficient heuristic algorithm for
the general NP-hard problem. Our results are illustrated by
numerical studies on benchmark systems including the IEEE
118-bus system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society depends heavily on the proper operation of
cyber-physical systems, examples of which include, but not
limited to, intelligent transport systems, industrial automation
systems, health care systems, and electric power distribution
and transmission systems. These cyber-physical systems are
supervised and controlled through Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Through remote terminal
units (RTUs), SCADA systems collect measurements and send
them to the state estimator to estimate the system states. The
estimated states are used for subsequent operations such as
system health monitoring and control. Any malfunctioning of
these operations can lead to significant social and economical
consequences such as the northeast US blackout of 2003 [1].
The technology and the use of the SCADA systems have
evolved a lot since they were introduced. The SCADA systems
now are interconnected to office LANs, and through them
they are connected to the Internet. Hence, today there are
more access points to the SCADA systems, and also more
functionalities to tamper with. For example, the RTUs can
be subjected to denial-of-service attacks. The communicated
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data can be subjected to false data attacks. Furthermore, the
SCADA master itself can be attacked. In the context of secured
cyber-physical systems in general, [2], [3] have considered
denial-of-service-like attacks and their impact. [4] has studied
replay attacks on the sensor measurements and [5], [6] have
considered false data attacks. This paper investigates the cyber
security issues related to false data attacks with the special
focus on the measurement systems of power networks. The
negative effects of false data attacks on power networks have
been exemplified by malware such as Stuxnet and Duqu.
False data attacks have received a lot of attention in the
literature (e.g., [7]–[14]). [7] was the first to point out that a
coordinated intentional data attack can be staged without being
detected by the state estimation bad data detection (BDD)
algorithm, a standard part of today’s SCADA/EMS system.
[7]–[9], [11]–[14] investigate the construction problem for
such “unobservable” data attack, especially the sparse ones
involving relatively few meters to compromise, under various
assumptions of the network (e.g., DC power flow model [15],
[16]). In particular, [7] poses the attack construction problem
as a cardinality minimization problem to find the sparsest
attack including a given set of target measurements. Refer-
ences [8], [9], [12] set up similar optimization problems for
the sparsest attack including a given measurement. References
[11], [14] seek the sparsest nonzero attack and [13] finds the
sparsest attack including exactly two injection measurements
and possibly more line power flow measurements, under the
assumption that all power injections are measured. The solu-
tion information of the above optimization problems can help
network operators identify the vulnerabilities in the network
and strategically assign protection resources (e.g., encryption
of measurements and secured PMUs) to their best effect (e.g.,
[9], [10], [14]). On the other hand, the unobservable data attack
problem has its connection to another vital EMS functionality
– observability analysis [15], [16]. In particular, solving the
attack construction problem can also solve an observability
analysis problem (this was explained in [17, Section II-C]).
This connection was first reported in [11], and was utilized in
[18] to compute the sparsest critical p-tuples for some integer
p. This is a generalization of critical measurements and critical
sets [15].
To perform the cyber-security analysis in a timely manner,
it is important to solve the data attack construction problem
efficiently. This effort has been discussed, for instance, in
[7]–[9], [11]–[14], [17]. The efficient solution to the attack
construction problem in [8] is the focus of this paper. The
matching pursuit method [19] employed in [7] and the basis
pursuit method [20] (l1 relaxation and its weighted variant)
employed in [14] are common efficient (i.e., polynomial time)
approaches to suboptimally solve the attack construction prob-
lem. However, these methods do not guarantee exact optimal
solutions, and they might not be sufficiently accurate. For
instance, [12] describes a naive application of basis pursuit and
its consequences. While [11], [14] provide polynomial time
solution procedures for their respective attack construction
problems, the problems therein are different from the one in
this paper in that the considered problem in this paper is not a
special case of the ones in [11], [14]. In particular, in [11] the
attack vector contains at least one nonzero entry. However, this
nonzero entry cannot be given a priori. This means that the
problem considered in this paper is more general than the one
in [11]. [14] needs to restrict the number of nonzero injection
measurements attacked, while there is no such constraint in
the problem considered in this paper.
Other relevant previous work include [12], [17], [18], which
also consider the data attack construction problem in this
paper. In [12], [18] the attack construction problem is for-
mulated as a graph generalized minimum cut problem (to be
defined in Section IV-C). However, it is not known in [12],
[18] whether the generalized minimum cut problem can be
solved efficiently (i.e., in polynomial time) or not. Indeed, [12],
[18] only provide approximate solutions. Instead, the current
work establishes that the generalized minimum cut problem
is indeed exactly solvable in polynomial time. This work
establishes the result by constructing a practical polynomial
time algorithm. Regarding [17], one of the main distinctions
is that [17] makes an assumption that no bus injections are
metered. The current result requires a different assumption
that the network is fully measured as in [13] (i.e., all bus
injections and line power flows are metered). In addition, [17]
considers a more general case where the constraint matrix is
totally unimodular, whereas the focus of the current paper is a
graph problem. The setup considered by this paper is specific
to power network applications and thus it enables a more
efficient solution algorithm. Finally, note that the notion of
minimum cut problem has been explored also in other power
network applications (e.g., [21]–[23]).
Outline: In the next section, we present the optimization
problem of interest, namely the security index problem, and
discuss its applications. Then Sections III, IV and V present
the technical contributions of this paper, focusing on a spe-
cialized version of the security index problem defined in (8)
in the end of Section II-B. In Section III the complexity of the
security index problem is analyzed. We show that the security
index problem is NP-hard in general, but in Section IV we
demonstrate that under some realistic assumptions it can be
restated as a generalized minimum cut (Min Cut) problem.
In Section V we show that the generalized Min Cut problem
can be solved efficiently, by reformulating it as a classical
Min Cut problem. The specialized version considered in
Sections III, IV and V turns out to be not restrictive, as far as
the application of the proposed results is concerned. This will
be explained in Section VI. In Section VII a simple numerical
example is first presented to illustrate that the proposed solu-
tion correctly solves the generalized Min Cut problem, while
previous methods cannot. Then the efficiency and accuracy
of the proposed solution to the security index problem are
demonstrated through a case study with large-scale benchmark
systems. We also demonstrate that our method provides an
efficient and high quality approximate solution to the general
problem security index problem which is NP-hard.
II. THE SECURITY INDEX PROBLEM
In Section II-A the mathematical model of the power
networks considered is first described. Then in Section II-B
the security index of power networks is defined.
A. Power Network Model and State Estimation
A power network is modeled as a graph with n+ 1 nodes
and m edges. The nodes and edges model the buses and
transmission lines in the power network, respectively. In the
present text, the terms node and bus are used interchangeably,
and the same is true for edges and transmission lines (or simply
lines). The topology of the graph is described by a directed
incidence matrix A ∈R(n+1)×m, in which the directions along
the edges are arbitrarily specified [12]. The physical property
of the network is described by a nonsingular diagonal matrix
D ∈ Rm×m, whose nonzero entries are the reciprocals of the
reactance of the transmission lines. In general, the reactance
is positive (i.e., inductive) and hence the matrix D is assumed
to be positive definite throughout this paper.
In the sequel, the set of all nodes and the set of all directed
edges of the power network graph are denoted V 0 and E0,
respectively. The edge directions are consistent with those in
A. An element of V 0 is denoted by vi ∈ V 0, and an element
of E0 is denoted by (vi,v j) ∈ E0 for vi ∈V 0 and v j ∈V 0. The
set of all neighbors of vi is denoted by N(vi). A node v j is a
neighbor of vi if either (vi,v j) ∈ E0 or (v j,vi) ∈ E0.
The states of the network include bus voltage phase angles
and bus voltage magnitudes, the latter of which are typically
assumed to be constant (one in the per unit system). Therefore,
the network states can be captured in a vector θ ∈ [0,2pi)n+1.
The state estimator estimates θ based on the measurements
obtained from the network. In reality the model relating
the states and the measurements is nonlinear. However, for
state estimation data attack analysis [7]–[14], [17] (and more
traditionally bad data analysis [15], [16], [24]) it suffices to
consider the DC power flow model [15], [16]. In the DC power
flow model the measurement vector, denoted as z, is related
to θ by
z = Hθ +∆z, where H ,

 P1DAT−P2DAT
P3ADAT

 . (1)
In (1), ∆z can either be a vector of random error or intentional
additive data attack (e.g., [7]), and P1, P2 and P3 consist of
subsets of rows of identity matrices of appropriate dimensions,
indicating which measurements are actually taken. The term
P1DAT θ contains line power flow measurements, measured at
the outgoing ends of the lines. Similarly, −P2DAT θ contains
the line power flow measurements at the incoming ends of
the lines. The term P3ADAT θ contains bus power injection
measurements, one entry for each measured bus.
Measurement redundancy is a common practice in power
networks [15], [16]. Therefore, it is assumed in this paper
that the measurement system described by H is observable –
meaning that if any column of H is removed the remaining
submatrix still has rank n [15], [16]. Note that H cannot have
rank n+ 1 since the sum of all columns of H is always a
zero column vector (a property of any incidence matrix A). In
the practice of power system state estimation, it is customary
to designate an arbitrary node as the reference and set the
corresponding entry of θ to zero. Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that the first entry of θ is zero (i.e., θ (1) = 0)
and denote θ2: as the rest of the entries of θ . For convenience,
let H2: denote H with the first column removed. By definition,
Hθ = H2:θ2: and H2: has full column rank (= n) since H is
observable. Given measurements z, the estimate of the network
states is typically determined via the least squares approach
[15], [16]:
ˆθ2: = (H2:TW H2:)
−1H2:TWz, (2)
where W is a given positive-definite diagonal matrix, whose
nonzero entries are typically the reciprocals of the variances of
the measurement noise. The state estimate ˆθ =
[
0 ˆθ T2:
]T is
subsequently fed to other vital SCADA functionalities such
as optimal power flow (OPF) calculation and contingency
analysis (CA). Therefore, the accuracy and reliability of ˆθ
is of paramount concern.
B. Security Index
To detect possible faults or data attacks in the measurements
z, the BDD test is commonly performed ( [15], [16]). In a
typical strategy, if the norm of the residual
residual , z−H2: ˆθ2 = (I−H2:(H2:TWH2:)
−1H2:TW )∆z (3)
is too big, then the BDD alarm is triggered. The BDD test is in
general sufficient to detect the presence of a random error ∆z
[15], [16]. However, in face of a coordinated malicious attack
the BDD test can fail. In particular, in [7] it was reported that
an attack of the form
∆z = H∆θ (4)
for an arbitrary ∆θ ∈Rn+1 would result in a zero residual in (3)
since H∆θ = H2:∆θ2: for some ∆θ2: ∈ Rn. Data attack in the
form of (4) is unobservable from the BDD perspective, and this
was also experimentally verified in [25] in a realistic SCADA
system testbed. Since [7], there has been a significant amount
of literature studying the unobservable attack in (4) and its
consequences to state estimation data integrity (e.g., [8]–[11],
[13], [14]). In particular, [8] introduced the notion of security
index αk for a measurement k as the optimal objective value
of the following cardinality minimization problem:
αk , min
∆θ∈Rn+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to H(k, :)∆θ = 1,
(5)
where card(·) denotes the cardinality of its argument, k is
the label of the measurement for which the security index
αk is computed, and H(k, :) denotes the kth row of H. αk is
the minimum number of measurements an attacker needs to
compromise in order to attack measurement k without being
detected. In particular, a small αk implies that measurement k
is relatively easy to compromise in an unobservable attack.
As a result, the knowledge of the security indices for all
measurements allows the network operator to pinpoint the
security vulnerabilities of the network, and to better protect
the network with limited resource. For example, [9] proposed
a method to optimally assign limited encryption protection
resources to improve the security of the network based on its
security indices.
It should be emphasized that the security index defined
in (5) can provide a security assessment that the standard
power network BDD procedure [15], [16] might not be able
to provide. As a concrete example [8], consider the simple
network whose H2: matrix is
H2: =


−1 −1 0
−1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 −1
0 −1 0

 . (6)
From (2), the “hat matrix” [15], [16], denoted K is defined
according to
zˆ = H2: ˆθ2 = H2:(H2:TW H2:)
−1H2:TWz , Kz.
Assuming W = I, the K matrix associated with H2: in (6) is
K =


0.6 0.2 −0.2 0 0.4
0.2 0.4 −0.4 0 −0.2
−0.2 −0.4 0.4 0 0.2
0 0 0 1 0
0.4 −0.2 0.2 0 0.6

 . (7)
The hat matrix K shows how the measurements z are weighted
together to form a power flow estimate zˆ. The rows of the hat
matrix can be used to study the measurement redundancy in
the system [15], [16]. Typically a large degree of redundancy
(many non-zero entries in each row) is desirable to compensate
for noisy or missing measurements. In (7), it is seen that all
measurements are redundant except the fourth which is called
a critical measurement. Without the critical measurement
observability is lost. From the hat matrix one is led to believe
that the critical measurement is sensitive to attacks. This is
indeed the case, but some other measurements can also be
vulnerable to attacks. It can be shown - for example using
the method that we develop, that the security indices αk,
k = 1, . . . ,5, respectively, are 2, 3, 3, 1, 2. Therefore, the
fourth measurement (critical measurement) has security index
one, indicating that it is indeed vulnerable to unobservable
attacks. However, the first and the last measurements also have
relatively small security indices. This is not obvious from K in
(7). Hence, we cannot rely on the hat matrix for vulnerability
analysis of power networks.
For ease of exposition but without loss of generality, instead
of (5) the following version of the security index problem with
a specialized constraint will be the focus of the parts of the
paper where the main technical contributions are presented
(i.e., Sections III, IV and V):
minimize
∆θ∈Rn+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0,
(8)
where e ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} is given. The restriction introduced in
(8) is that it can only enforce constraints on edge flows but
not on node injections as directly allowed by (5). We will see
however in Section VI that all results obtained for (8) can be
extended to the general case in (5).
III. THE SECURITY INDEX PROBLEM IS NP-HARD
Consider a variant of (5) where k is not fixed (i.e., one
wishes to minimize card(H∆θ ) under the constraint that at
least one entry of H∆θ is nonzero). This variant of (5) is
known to be the cospark of H2: in compressed sensing [26].
The cospark of H2: is the same as the spark of F , where F
is a matrix of full row rank such that FH2: = 0 [26]. The
spark of F is defined as the minimum number of columns
of F which are linearly dependent [27]. It is established that
computing the spark of a general matrix F is NP-hard [28],
[29]. Consequently, because of the equivalence between spark
and cospark, unless P = NP there is no efficient algorithm
to solve the security index problem in (5) if the H matrix is
not assumed to retain any special structure. In power network
applications, the H matrix in fact possesses special structure
as defined in (1). Nevertheless, the security index problem,
even the specialized version in (8), is still computationally
intractable as indicated by the following statement:
Theorem 1: Unless P = NP, there is no polynomial time
algorithm that solves the problem (8), with H defined in (1),
even if D is the identity matrix and P2 = 0.
Proof: Our proof proceeds by reduction from the positive
one-in-three 3SAT problem [30]: Given a set of M triples of
indices C j = (α j ,β j,γ j)∈ {1, . . . ,n}3, does there exist a vector
x˜∈ {0,1}n such that for every j, exactly one among x˜α j , x˜β j , x˜γ j
is 1 and the others 0.
Consider an instance of the positive one-in-three 3SAT
problem, and let us build an equivalent instance of (5). We
set P2 to 0, and set D as the identity matrix. As a result, non-
trivially zero entries of H∆θ corresponding to edges (i, j) will
be of the form ∆θi−∆θ j, while those corresponding to a node
i will be of the form ∑ j:(i, j)∈E(∆θ j−∆θi). We remind that the
entry of an edge is trivially zero if the corresponding entry in
P1 is 0, and that of a node is trivially zero if the corresponding
entry of P3 is 0.
We begin by defining a node 1 and a node 0 connected by
an edge whose corresponding entry in P1 is set to 1. We set
k such that the constraint H(k, :)∆θ = 1 in (5) corresponds
to this edge, so that their must hold ∆θ1 −∆θ0 = 1 for any
solution of the problem. Since H∆θ is not modified when
adding a constant to all entries of ∆θ , we assume without loss
of generality that ∆θ1 = 1 and ∆θ0 = 0.
The goal of the first part of our construction is to represent
the variables. For every i = 1, . . . ,n, we define a node xi that
we connect to both 1 and 0. We set to 1 the entries of P1
corresponding to the edges (1,xi) and (0,xi), and to 0 the
entries of P3 corresponding to xi. Observe that the two entries
of H∆θ corresponding to these two edges are 1−∆θxi and
0−∆θxi , which cannot be simultaneously 0. Moreover, one of
them is equal to zero if and only if ∆θxi is either 0 or 1.
Taking into account the fact the entry of H∆θ corresponding
to the edge (1,0) is by definition 1, we have thus proved that
card(H∆θ ) ≥ n+ 1 for any ∆θ , independently of the rest of
the construction. Moreover, card(H∆θ ) = n+1 only if ∆θxi ∈
{0,1} for every i, and if the entries of H∆θ corresponding
to all the edges and nodes introduced in the sequel are 0.
The remainder of the construction, represented in Fig. 1, is
designed to ensure that all these entries can be 0 only if the
(binary) values ∆θxi solves the initial instance of the positive
one-in-three 3SAT problem.
We first generate a reference value at 13 for every clause: We
define two nodes indexed by 23 and
1
3 , and add the connections
(1, 23),(
2
3 ,
1
3 ),(
1
3 ,0). The entries of P1 corresponding to these
connections are set to 0, but the entry of P3 corresponding to
the nodes 13 and
2
3 are set to 1. Besides, we define for every
clause j = 1, . . . ,M a clause node c j connected to 13 by an
edge whose corresponding entry in P1 is set to one.
The entries of H∆θ corresponding to the edges between 13
and c j are ∆θ 1
3
−∆θc j , which are thus zero only when ∆θc j =
∆θ 1
3
for every j. Using these equalities, observe now that the
entry of H∆θ corresponding to 13 is
∆θ 2
3
+∆θ0 +
M
∑
j=1
∆θc j − (2+M)∆θ 13 = ∆θ 23 + 0− 2∆θ 13 ,
while the entry corresponding to 23 is 1+∆θ 13 −2∆θ 23 . These
two entries are thus equal to zero if and only if ∆θ 2
3
= 23 and
∆θc j = ∆θ 13 =
1
3 for every j, as intended.
We now represent the clauses. For each j, we connect the
clause node c j to the nodes xα j , xβ j and xγ j of the three
variables involved by edges whose corresponding entries in
P1 are zero. On the other hand, we set to 1 the entry of P3
corresponding to c j. The corresponding (non trivially zero)
entries of H∆θ are then
∆θxα j +∆θxβ j +∆θxγ j −3∆θc j = ∆θxα j +∆θxβ j +∆θxγ j −1.
Remembering that ∆θxi is either 1 or 0 for any i, this latter
expression can be zero only if exactly one among ∆θxα j ,
∆θxβ j and ∆θxγ j is 1. If that is the case, setting x˜i = ∆θxi for
every i yields a vector x that solves the instance of positive
one-in-three 3SAT.
We have thus shown that there exists a ∆θ for which
card(H∆θ )= n+1 only if the ∆θxi are binary, and if the binary
vector x˜ obtained by setting x˜i = ∆θxi solves the instance of
positive one-in-three 3SAT. Conversely, one can verify that if
a binary vector x˜ solves the instance of the one-in-three 3SAT
problem, then setting ∆θxi = x˜i for every i, ∆θc j = ∆θ 13 =
1
3
for every j and ∆θ 2
3
= 23 yields a cost card(H∆θ ) = n+1. The
latter cost can thus be obtained if and only if the initial positive
one-in-three 3SAT problem is achievable. This achieves the
proof because our construction clearly takes an amount of
time that grows polynomially with the size of the instance
C, and unless P = NP there is no polynomial time algorithm
that solves the positive one-in-three 3SAT [30].
Remark 1: (5) is also NP-hard since (8) is a special case of
(5).
Fig. 1. Representation of a part of the construction of the proof of Theorem 1,
including the reference values of ∆θ and one clause C j . Edges are represented
by dashed line when they are measured and continuous lines otherwise. Nodes
are represented by squares when they are measured and circles otherwise. If
card (H∆θ ) = n+ 1, ∆θ takes only values 1 and 0 for the xi and all entries
of H∆θ other than those corresponding to the nodes xi must be zero. As a
result, a dashed edge transmits no current and enforces equality between the
values of the nodes to which it is incident, and circle nodes enforce that the
sum of the currents on the incident edges should be 0. These constraints can
only be satisfied if ∆θc j = 13 , and if exactly one of the nodes involved in each
clause is at 1 and the others at 0.
IV. TRACTABLE SPECIAL CASES OF THE SECURITY INDEX
PROBLEM
In Section IV-A we show that, under the full measurement
assumption, the security index problem can be solved by solv-
ing its restriction where decision variables take binary values.
Section IV-B presents the proof of the statement which implies
our finding in Section IV-A. Section IV-B also discusses the
relationship between the security index problem and its binary
restriction defined in Section IV-A. Section IV-C describes the
consequences of Sections IV-A and IV-B, explaining how the
security index problem can be reformulated as a generalized
minimum cut problem with costly nodes, a graph problem
whose efficient solution will be discussed in Section V.
A. The Security Index Problem Under Full Measurement
Assumption
Even though in general the security index problem in
(8) is NP-hard for H defined in (1), there exist interesting
specializations that are solvable in polynomial time. One such
case is the full measurement situation where P1 = I, P2 = I
and P3 = I. In [12], [13] the full measurement assumption
is also considered, motivated by the situations where all
power flows and injections are measured in future smart grid
applications. The polynomial time complexity of (8) under
the full measurement assumption can be established in three
steps. Firstly, it can be shown that problem (8) can be solved
by solving a restriction where the decision vector ∆θ is a
binary vector. Secondly, in Section IV-C it will be shown that
the binary restriction of (8) can be expressed in a generalized
Min Cut problem with costly nodes. Finally, this generalized
Min Cut problem can be shown to be solvable in polynomial
time. This is to be explained in Section V.
The first step is formalized in the following statement,
whose preliminary version appeared in [12].
Proposition 1: Let H in (1) satisfy the full measurement
assumption that P1 = I, P2 = I, and P3 = I. Consider the
following restriction of problem (8) with 0-1 binary decision
vector:
minimize
∆θ∈{0,1}n+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0.
(9)
It holds that every optimal solution of (9) is an optimal solution
of (8) (i.e., the problem with the same formulation except that
∆θ is not restricted to binary values).
Proof: Proposition 1 is a corollary of the more general
Theorem 2 to be described in Section IV-B.
Remark 2: Since there cannot be any all zero column
in any incidence matrix A, problem (8) and (9) are always
feasible. Proposition 1 states that, under the full measurement
assumption, an optimal solution of (8) can always be obtained
by solving (9). The later problem will be shown to be solvable
in polynomial time.
B. The Security Index Problem with Binary Decision Vector
In the sequel, let ci j ≥ 0 represent the cost of attacking
the power flow measurements of a line (vi,v j), and pi ≥ 0
the cost of attacking the injection measurement at bus vi.
Problems (8) can be reformulated in a more general way that
also allows taking into account the fact that tempering with
certain measurements may be more expensive than with some
others:
minimize
∆θ∈Rn+1
cT g(DAT ∆θ )+ pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
subject to A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0,
(10)
and the corresponding reformulation of (9) is defined by
minimize
∆θ∈{0,1}n+1
cT g(DAT ∆θ )+ pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
subject to A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0.
(11)
In (10) and (11), g is a vector-valued indicator function such
that for any vector x, gi(x) = 1 if xi 6= 0 and gi(x) = 0 other-
wise. It can be seen that if ci j ∈ {0,1,2} and pi ∈ {0,1}, then
(8) and (9) are recovered. Let [DAT ∆θ]
(vi,v j)
denote the entry
of DAT ∆θ corresponding to edge (vi,v j), and let
[
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
denote the entry of ADAT ∆θ corresponding to node vi. With a
slight abuse of notation, the symbol g
([
DAT ∆θ
]
(vi,v j)
)
denotes
the entry of g(DAT ∆θ ) corresponding to (vi,v j). In addition,
g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
)
is defined similarly.
The following theorem characterizes the relationship be-
tween the security index problem in (8) and its binary re-
striction in (9) by studying their respective generalizations of
(10) and (11) for arbitrary nonnegative vectors c and p.
Theorem 2: Let Jc and Jb, respectively, denote the optimal
objective values of (10) and (11) with A and D defined in (1),
c ∈ Rm+, p ∈R
n+1
+ and e ∈ {1,2, . . . ,m} given. Then
0 ≤ Jb− Jc ≤ ∑
vi∈V 0
max
{
0, max
v j∈N(vi)
{
pi− ci j
}}
. (12)
Proof: First note that both (10) and (11) are always
feasible with finite optimal objective values attained by some
optimal solutions. In addition, 0 ≤ Jb− Jc holds because (11)
is a restriction of (10). To show the upper bound in (12)
the main idea is that for each feasible solution ∆θ of (10)
it is possible to construct a feasible solution ∆φ of (11), such
that the objective value difference is bounded from above
by ∑
vi∈V 0
max
{
0, max
v j∈N(vi)
{
pi − ci j
}}
. The construction is as
follows. Let ∆θ be a feasible solution of (10), and let ∆θ (vi) be
its entry corresponding to node vi ∈V 0. Since ∆θ is feasible,
the constraint A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0 implies that there exist two nodes
denoted vs and vt with e corresponding to either (vs,vt) or
(vt ,vs) such that ∆θ (vs) 6= ∆θ (vt). Without loss of generality,
it is assumed that ∆θ (vs)> ∆θ (vt). Define ∆φ ∈ {0,1}n+1 by
∆φ(vi) =
{
1 if ∆θ (vi)> ∆θ (vt)
0 if ∆θ (vi)≤ ∆θ (vt)
∀ vi ∈V 0. (13)
Note that ∆φ is feasible to (11) since ∆φ(vs) 6= ∆φ(vt) by
construction. Also notice that for any two nodes vi and v j if
∆θ (vi)=∆θ (v j) then ∆φ(vi)=∆φ(v j). Hence, in the objective
functions of (10) and (11) it holds that
ci jg
([
DAT ∆θ
]
(vi,v j)
)
≥ ci jg
([
DAT ∆φ]
(vi,v j)
)
, ∀ (vi,v j)∈E0.
(14)
In other words, for each edge the contribution to the objective
function with the new solution ∆φ is smaller than or equal to
that with the initial one ∆θ . To finish the proof, the objective
function contribution due to the node injections needs to be
investigated. Let Vb ⊂V 0 be defined such that
vi ∈Vb ⇐⇒ g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
)
= 0, g
([
ADAT ∆φ]
vi
)
= 1.
(15)
In essence, Vb encompasses all causes for Jb > Jc. Con-
sider vi ∈ Vb, since g
([
ADAT ∆φ]
vi
)
= 1, there exists vk ∈
N(vi) such that ∆θ (vk) 6= ∆θ (vi). Consequently, the fact
that g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
)
= 0 implies that there exists v+i =
argmaxvk∈N(vi){∆θ (vk)} such that ∆θ (v
+
i ) > ∆θ (vi). Sim-
ilarly, there exists v−i = argminvk∈N(vi){∆θ (vk)} such that
∆θ (v−i ) < ∆θ (vi). If ∆θ (vi) > ∆θ (vt), then (13) implies
that ∆φ(v+i ) = ∆φ(vi) = 1. In addition, it holds that if
v+i ∈ Vb then vi 6= argmaxvk∈N(v+i ){∆θ (vk)}. This is true be-
cause argmaxvk∈N(v+i ){∆θ (vk)}> ∆θ (v
+
i )> ∆θ (vi) if v+i ∈Vb.
Conversely, if ∆θ (vi) ≤ ∆θ (vt), then ∆φ(v−i ) = ∆φ(vi) =
0. Similar to the case with v+i , if v
−
i ∈ Vb, then vi 6=
argminvk∈N(v−i ){∆θ (vk)}. In summary, for each vi ∈ Vb, there
exists an edge ei ∈ E0 in one of the following forms (vi,v+i ),
(v+i ,vi), (vi,v
−
i ) or (v
−
i ,vi) such that
g
([
DAT ∆θ
]
ei
)
= 1, g
([
DAT ∆φ]
ei
)
= 0 (16a)
ei 6= e j ∀ vi 6= v j (16b)∣∣∣{ei vi ∈Vb}∣∣∣= |Vb| (16c)
Using the above argument, the inequality in (12) can be
deduced as follows: For all feasible solutions ∆θ of (10), it
holds that
Jb− cT g(DAT ∆θ )− pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
≤ cT g(DAT ∆φ)+ pT g(ADAT ∆φ)
−cT g(DAT ∆θ )− pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
(17)
because ∆φ is a feasible solution of (11) and Jb is the optimal
objective value of (11). Because of (16b), {ei vi ∈ Vb} does
not contain duplicated edges. Therefore, the right-hand-side of
(17) is equal to
∑
vi∈Vb
pi
(
g
([
ADAT ∆φ]
vi
)
− g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
))
+ ∑{
ei vi∈Vb
}cei
(
g
([
DAT ∆φ]
ei
)
− g
([
DAT ∆θ
]
ei
))
+ ∑
vi∈V 0\Vb
pi
(
g
([
ADAT ∆φ]
vi
)
− g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
))
+ ∑
E0\
{
ei vi∈Vb
}cei
(
g
([
DAT ∆φ]
ei
)
− g
([
DAT ∆θ
]
ei
))
.
(18)
In addition, because of (15), (16a) and (16c) the expression in
(18) is equal to
∑
vi∈Vb
(
pi− cei
)
+ ∑
vi∈V 0\Vb
pi
(
g
([
ADAT ∆φ]
vi
)
− g
([
ADAT ∆θ
]
vi
))
+ ∑
E0\
{
ei vi∈Vb
}cei
(
g
([
DAT ∆φ]
ei
)
− g
([
DAT ∆θ
]
ei
))
.
(19)
Because of (15) and (14), the last two sums in (19) are
nonpositive. Therefore, it holds that
Jb− cT g(DAT ∆θ )− pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
≤ ∑
vi∈Vb
(
pi− cei
)
≤ ∑
vi∈Vb
max
v j∈N(vi)
{
pi− ci j
}
≤ ∑
vi∈V 0
max
{
0, max
v j∈N(vi)
{
pi− ci j
}}
.
(20)
Finally, since (20) applies to all feasible solutions ∆θ of (10),
the upper bound in (12) follows.
Remark 3: The full measurement assumption in Proposi-
tion 1 corresponds to a special case in Theorem 2 where ci j = 2
for all (vi,v j) ∈ E0 and pi = 1 for all vi ∈V 0. The inequalities
in (12) imply Proposition 1.
Remark 4: Theorem 2 suggests other situations where (8)
and (9) are equivalent. One example is when there is a meter
on each edge and there is at most one meter in each node.
In this case,
[
P1T P2T
]T does not have a zero column and
P3 consists of subsets of rows of an identity matrix. This
corresponds to ci j = 1 and pi ≤ 1 for all i, j in Theorem 2.
Another situation suggesting equivalence is as follows: if an
edge is not metered, then its two terminal nodes are not
metered either. This corresponds to a case when pi ≤ min
v j∈N(vi)
ci j
for all vi ∈V 0, implying that max
v j∈N(vi)
{
pi− ci j
}
= 0.
Remark 5: Without the full measurement assumption or
conditions such as those described in Remark 4, solving (9)
can lead to an approximate solution to (8) with an error upper
bound provided by (12). This error bound, however, is rather
conservative since the summation is over all nodes vi ∈V 0. As
developed in the proof, the summation is in fact over a subset
Vb of V 0. However, in general it is difficult to characterize the
Vb which leads to the tightest possible upper bound without
first solving (8) to optimality.
C. Reformulating the Security Index Problem into Generalized
Min Cut Problem with Costly Nodes
The above discussion suggests that the (exact or approxi-
mate) solution to the security index problem is obtained by
solving (11), whose graph interpretation will be the focus of
this subsection. In (11) the choice of 0 or 1 for each entry of
∆θ is a partitioning of the nodes into two parts. The constraint
A(:,e)T ∆θ 6= 0 enforces that the two end nodes of edge e,
denoted as vs and vt , must be in two different parts of the
partition. In the objective function, the term cT g(DAT ∆θ ) is
the sum of the edge weights of the edges whose two ends are
in different parts (i.e., edges that are “cut”, in an undirected
sense). In addition, since ∆θ has binary entries, a row of
ADAT ∆θ is zero if and only if the corresponding node and all
its neighbors are in the same part of the partition (i.e., none of
the incident edges are cut). Therefore, the term pT g(ADAT ∆θ )
in the objective function is the sum of the node weights of the
nodes connected to at least one cut edge. In summary, (11) can
be reinterpreted as a generalized minimum cut problem on an
undirected graph (i.e., the original power network graph with
the edge direction ignored). The generalization is due to the
presence of the node weights.
We now define formally the Min Cut with costly
nodes problem (on any given directed graph) of which (11)
is a special case. Let G(V,E) be a directed graph (we will see
that the problem can be particularized to undirected graphs),
where V denotes the set of nodes {v1, . . . ,vn+1}, and E the set
of directed edges; and suppose that a cost ci j ≥ 0 is associated
to each directed edge (vi,v j) and a cost pi ≥ 0 is associated to
each node vi. We designate two special nodes: a source node
vs and a sink node vt . The problem is the following:
Problem 1:
The Min Cut with costly nodes problem.
Find a partition of V , denoted as P = {Ss,St}, such that
Ss,St ⊂V, Ss∩St = /0, Ss∪St =V, s ∈ Ss, t ∈ St
which minimizes the cost
C(P) = ∑
(vi,v j)∈E:vi∈Ss,v j∈St
ci j
+ ∑
vi∈Ss:∃(vi,v j)∈E:v j∈St
pi + ∑
v j∈St :∃(vi ,v j)∈E:vi∈Ss
p j.
(21)
By convention, if vi ∈ Ss,v j ∈ St , for two nodes vi,v j, we will
say that both these nodes, and the edge (vi,v j), are in the cut,
or that this edge is cut.
Notice that in a directed graph an edge (vi,v j) is cut if
vi ∈ Ss and v j ∈ St but not in the reverse case, where vi ∈ St and
v j ∈ Ss, and the cost ci j is not incurred in that latter case. This
asymmetry disappears however in symmetric graphs, in which
to each edge (vi,v j) with weight ci j corresponds a symmetric
edge (v j,vi) with same weight. For these symmetric graphs,
v1 v2
v3 v4
v˜1
v˜2
G
G˜
v˜3
v˜4
w˜4w˜3w˜2w˜1
z˜1 z˜2 z˜3 z˜4
c12 c32
c34
c12 c32
c34
Fig. 2. Representation of the auxiliary graph ˜G associated to the graph G.
The dotted diagonal edges all have the same weight C > max pi. The vertical
dashed edges linking w˜i to v˜i and v˜i to z˜i have weight pi.
the cost ci j is incurred as soon as vi and v j are not in the same
set. Indeed, exactly one among (vi,v j) and (v j,vi) is in the cut
in that case. The cost (21) consists then of the sum of the ci j
over all pairs of nodes vi,v j that are in different sets, and
consists of the sum of the pi over all nodes that are adjacent
to nodes in a different set. This is problem (11). In addition,
by letting ci j = c ji = 2 for every edge and pi = 1 for every
node, one recovers problem (9) under the full measurement
assumption. We will show in Section V how to solve Problem
1, and therefore the problems in (11), (9) and (8).
V. AN EFFICIENT SOLUTION TO THE TRACTABLE CASES OF
THE SECURITY INDEX PROBLEM
This section presents the efficient solution to the Min Cut
with costly nodes problem (i.e., Problem 1) introduced
in Section IV-C. The proposed solution method also solves the
security index problem under the full measurement assump-
tion, since this problem is a special case of the Min Cut
with costly nodes problem.
A. Construction of an Auxiliary Graph
Consider a directed graph G(V,E),V = {v1, . . . ,vn+1} with
a set of nonnegative weights ci j ≥ 0, and pi ≥ 0 for each node
vi ∈ V , a source node vs and a sink node vt . We build an
auxiliary graph ˜G using the following algorithm, illustrated in
Fig. 2 on an example:
1) Define the set ˜V = {v˜i, w˜i, z˜i : 1≤ i≤ n+1} of nodes of
the auxiliary graph.
2) Designate v˜s and v˜t as source and sink nodes respec-
tively.
3) For all 1≤ i≤ n+1, add the two directed edges (w˜i, v˜i)
and (v˜i, z˜i), both with cost pi.
4) For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n+ 1 : (vi,v j) ∈ E
• add the edge (v˜i, v˜ j) with cost ci j.
• add the two edges (v˜i, w˜ j) and (z˜i, v˜ j), both with a
cost C > maxi pi.
The intuition behind the construction of ˜G is the following:
Suppose that one wants to cut the edge (v˜i, v˜ j), then one must
also cut at least either (v˜i, z˜i) or (z˜i, v˜ j) (see Fig. 2). Because
the latter has a higher cost C, one will naturally cut (v˜i, z˜i),
incurring a cost pi. Moreover, since that edge does not depend
on j, one just needs to cut it (and pay the associated cost) once,
independently of the number of other edges (v˜i, v˜k) that will be
cut. A similar reasoning applies to the path (v˜i, w˜ j) or (w˜ j, v˜ j).
Therefore, the cost of a minimum cut on ˜G will consists of
the sum of all ci j for all edges (v˜i, v˜ j) in the cut, and of the
sum of all pi for nodes incident to one or several edges (v˜i, v˜ j)
or (v˜ j, v˜i) in the cut, i.e., to the cost of the equivalent cut on
the initial graph G, taking the costly nodes into account.
B. Equivalence with Min Cut on the Auxiliary Graph
We now show formally that solving the standard Min
Cut problem on this weighted graph provides a solution to
Problem 1 on the initial graph, and that a solution is obtained
by directly translating the partition of the v˜i into the equivalent
partition of the vi.
Theorem 3: Consider a graph G(V,E) with a set of weights
ci j ≥ 0 for each edge (vi,v j) ∈ E , and pi ≥ 0 for each node
vi ∈V , a source node vs and a sink node vt . Let ˜G( ˜V , ˜E) be the
modified graph obtained from G by the procedure described
above, and the partition ˜V = { ˜Ss, ˜St} be an optimal solution
of the standard Min Cut problem for ˜G. Then the partition
{Ss,St} of V , obtained by letting vi ∈ Ss if and only if v˜i ∈ ˜Ss,
is an optimal solution to Problem 1 on G.
Proof: Let us call respectively c∗ and c˜∗ the optimal cost
of Problem 1 on the graph G and Min Cut problem on the
graph ˜G. In the sequel, we always assume that the source and
sink nodes belong to the appropriate set of the partition.
We first prove that c˜∗ ≤ c∗, by showing that for any cut in
G with cost c (i.e., the sum of the costs of the edges and the
nodes in the cut is c), one can build a cut in ˜G whose cost is
equal to c in the following way: For any 1 ≤ i≤ n+ 1,
1) If vi ∈ Ss, and all the out-neighbors of vi are in Ss, put
v˜i, w˜i and z˜i in ˜Ss.
2) if vi ∈ St , and all the in-neighbors of vi are in St , put v˜i,
w˜i and z˜i in ˜St .
3) if vi ∈ Ss, and at least one out-neighbor of vi is in St ,
put v˜i, w˜i in ˜Ss and z˜i in ˜St .
4) if vi ∈ St , and at least one in-neighbor of vi is in Ss, put
v˜i, z˜i in ˜St and w˜i in ˜Ss.
One can verify that no edge with cost C is in the cut,
and that an edge (v˜i, v˜ j) is in the cut if and only if the
corresponding edge (vi,v j) (which has the same weight) is in
the initial cut. Moreover, for every node i, the edge (w˜i, v˜i),
of weight pi, will be in the cut if and only if at least one
edge arriving at vi was in the initial cut. Similarly, the edge
(v˜i, z˜i) will be in the cut if and only if at least one edge
leaving vi is in the initial cut. So, there will be a contribution
pi to the total cost if at least an edge arriving at vi is in the
cut or at least one edge leaving vi is in the cut (note that the
two situations cannot happen simultaneously.)
As a conclusion, the cost of the cut {Ss,St} in G (counting
the weights of the nodes) is equal to the cost of the cut
{ ˜Ss, ˜St} in ˜G.
Consider now an arbitrary cut in ˜G, and the corresponding
cut in G obtained by putting vi in Ss if and only if v˜i ∈ ˜Ss, as
explained in the statement of this theorem. We show that the
cut of G obtained has a cost (taking the vertex costs pi into
account) smaller than or equal to the cost of the initial cut.
This will imply that c˜∗ ≥ c∗.
The cost of this new cut {Ss,St} consists indeed of all the
ci j of edges (vi,v j) in the cut, and all the pi of the nodes at
which arrives, or from which leaves an edge in the cut.
Consider first an edge (vi,v j) in the cut, i.e., vi ∈ Ss,v j ∈ St .
By construction, this implies that v˜i ∈ ˜Ss and v˜ j ∈ ˜St so that
the edge (v˜i, v˜ j) was also in the cut in ˜G, incurring a same
cost ci j.
Consider now a node vi from which leaves at least one edge
in the cut, incurring thus a cost pi. (A symmetric reasoning
applies if an edge in the cut arrives at vi, and no node has
edges in the cut both leaving from and arriving at it.) Call v j
the node at which arrives that edge. We have thus vi ∈ Ss and
v j ∈ St , and therefore v˜i ∈ ˜Ss, v˜ j ∈ ˜St in ˜G. This implies that
one edge of the path consisting of (v˜i, z˜i) and (z˜i, v˜ j) is in the
cut. These edges have respective costs pi and C > pi, so that a
cost at least pi will be incurred by the cut in ˜G. Note moreover
that none of these edges will appear when considering other
nodes and be counted more than once.
We have thus shown that to each cost in the cut {Ss,St} for
Problem 1 corresponds a larger or equal cost in { ˜Ss, ˜St} for
the Min Cut problem, and thus that the former has a smaller
cost.
Therefore, if one takes any cut of optimal cost c˜∗ for the
Min Cut problem on ˜G, and applies the procedure described
in the theorem, one obtains a cut of G with a smaller or equal
cost for Problem 1. Since we have proved that the optimal cost
of the latter problem is at least c˜∗, this implies that c˜∗ = c∗
and that the cost obtained is optimal for Problem 1 on G.
There exist many efficient polynomial time algorithms solv-
ing the Min Cut problem exactly when the weights are
nonnegative (e.g. [31], [32]). Theorem 3 implies that the same
algorithms can be used to solve efficiently Problem 1, and
therefore problem (9), and problem (8) in the fully measured
case. Moreover, observe that the size of this new graph ˜G is
proportional to that of G, as it has 3n nodes and 3|E|+ 2n
edges. The order of the polynomial measuring the efficiency
of the algorithms remains therefore unchanged. In particular,
if the standard Min Cut problem on the new graph ˜G
is solved using the algorithm in [31] whose complexity is
O(n|E|+ n2 log(n)), our algorithm has the same complexity.
Finally, consider a slight generalization of Problem 1 in
which each node contains two different weights (one for cut-
ting outgoing edges and the other for cutting incoming edges).
Then with a corresponding modification in the auxiliary graph
construction procedure in Section V-A (in the fourth bullet),
the proposed method can still solve the generalization in
polynomial time.
VI. THE ORIGINAL SECURITY INDEX PROBLEM
TARGETING EDGE AND NODE
The relationship between the original security index prob-
lem in (5), the problem in (8) and its binary restriction in (9)
is summarized as follows: In the case where H(k, :) in (5)
corresponds to the row of P1DAT and −P2DAT , (5) can be
restated as (8) with an appropriate choice of e. Consequently,
solving (9) either exactly solves (5) or approximately solves
(5) with an error bound provided by (12), depending upon
whether the full measurement assumption or similar ones in
Remark 4 are satisfied or not.
Next, consider the case where H(k, :) corresponds to a
row of P3ADAT . The constraint H(k, :)∆θ = 1 means that the
power injection at the target node, denoted vs, is nonzero.
This implies that at least one edge incident to vs should have
nonzero edge flow. Let ei with i = 1,2, . . . denote the column
indices of A of the incident edges of vs. For any given k,
consider the following instances (parameterized by ei)
Ji
(22) , min∆θ∈Rn+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to H(k, :)∆θ 6= 0
A(:,ei)T ∆θ 6= 0.
(22)
The minimum of Ji
(22), over all ei, is the optimal objective
value of (5). In addition, consider a relaxation of (22) as
Ji
(23) , min∆θ∈Rn+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to A(:,ei)T ∆θ 6= 0,
(23)
and its binary restriction
Ji
(24) , min∆θ∈{0,1}n+1
card
(
H∆θ
)
subject to A(:,ei)T ∆θ 6= 0.
(24)
(23) is an instance of (8), and the fact that (23) has one fewer
constraint than (22) implies that
Ji
(23) ≤ J
i
(22), ∀ i. (25)
On the other hand, (24) is an instance of (9), and
Ji
(24) ≥ J
i
(22), ∀ i, (26)
because if ∆θ ∈ {0,1}n+1 is feasible to (24), then it is also
feasible to (22). Notice, however, that a feasible solution of
(23) need not be feasible to (22). Let i⋆ be defined such that
Ji⋆
(22) =mini J
i
(22). The full measurement assumption or similar
ones in Remark 4 implies that Ji⋆
(24) = J
i⋆
(23). This, together
with (25) and (26), suggests that
Ji
⋆
(22) ≤ J
i⋆
(24) = J
i⋆
(23) ≤ J
i⋆
(22).
This implies that the equalities above hold throughout, and
solving (9) (by solving (24)) indeed solves the original security
index problem in (5) (by solving (22)). On the other hand, if
the full measurement assumption does not hold, then
Ji
⋆
(22) ≤ J
i⋆
(24) ≤ J
i⋆
(23)+∆J ≤ J
i⋆
(22)+∆J,
where the error upper bound ∆J can be obtained from (12). In
conclusion, all exact or approximate results pertaining to the
case between (8) and (9) apply to the case between (5) and
(9). As discussed in Remark 5, the above error bound might
be conservative. The approximation quality in practice will
be demonstrated in Section VII containing some numerical
examples on benchmark power networks.
vs
v1 v2 v3 vt
source
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100 1001
11
ps = 2
p1 = 0 p3 = 4p2 = 4 pt = 0
Fig. 3. An instance of Problem 1. vs and vt are the source and sink nodes,
respectively. The numbers next to the edges are the edge weights, and the
node weights are labeled, for example, as p2 = 4 for node v2 .
TABLE I
THE OBJECTIVE VALUES OF SOURCE SETS Ss = {vs} AND Ss = {vs,v1,v2}
IN THE GRAPH SETUPS OF THE CURRENT PAPER, [12] AND [18]. AS ONE
CAN SEE, ONLY OUR METHOD FINDS THE OPTIMAL CUT.
Ss cost in our method cost in [12] cost in [18]
{vs} 8 2 10
{vs,v1,v2} 9 1 9
VII. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Simple Illustrative Example of Problem 1
To illustrate that the proposed method is exact while previ-
ous methods (e.g., [12], [18]) are not, consider an instance of
Problem 1 depicted in Fig. 3. Only two partitions need to be
considered: Ss = {vs} and Ss = {vs,v1,v2}, with the respective
objective values being 8 and 9 (indeed, the choice Ss = {vs,v2}
is strictly worse than {vs,v1,v2}). As a comparison, the meth-
ods in [12], [18] are also attempted. In particular, both [12],
[18] solve standard Min Cut problems with edge weights
only. In [12] the node weights are simply ignored, while in
[18] the node weights are indirectly accounted for by adding
them to the weights of the incident edges. Table I summarizes
the objective values of the source sets {vs} and {vs,v1,v2}
for the three graph setups. The italic numbers indicate the
optimal objective values in the respective methods, suggesting
that both [12], [18] incorrectly choose Ss = {vs,v1,v2}, which
is suboptimal to Problem 1 in the current paper.
Constructing the auxiliary graph as described in Section V
and solving the corresponding standard Min Cut problem
leads to the node partitioning in Fig. 4. In the auxiliary graph
the optimal source set is {vs,w1,w2}, with the objective value
being 8. According to the rule in Theorem 3, {vs} is the
source set returned by the proposed procedure in this paper.
It correctly solves Problem 1.
B. The Security Index Problem on Benchmark Systems
To demonstrate the effectiveness and accuracy of the pro-
posed solution, the security index problem for two benchmark
systems is considered (IEEE 118-bus [33] and Polish 2383-bus
[34]). See Fig. 5 for an illustration of the 118-bus system.
First, the full measurement case is considered. The security
index problem in (5) is solved for each measurement, using
the proposed solution and the methods from [12], [18]. The
proposed method is guaranteed to provide the exact optimal
solutions, as explained earlier in the paper. Both for the 118-
bus and 2383-bus cases, the methods from [12], [18] are ex-
perimentally found to provide the exact solutions (though this
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Fig. 4. Solving the standard Min Cut problem in the auxiliary graph
corresponding to the instance in Fig. 3 (the irrelevant node ws is not shown). C
is a large scalar constant defined in the auxiliary graph construction procedure
in Section V-A. The black nodes form the optimal source set (in the auxiliary
graph), and the dotted red edges are cut. The optimal objective value is 8.
Fig. 5. IEEE 118-bus benchmark system [33]
is not guaranteed theoretically). The computation times for the
three methods are listed in Table II, indicating that the methods
have similar efficiency. The guarantee of optimality provided
by our approach is obtained at no additional computational
cost. The computation was performed on a PC with 2.4GHz
CPU and 2GB of RAM. The minimum cut problems are solved
using the MATLAB Boost Graph Library [35], [36].
TABLE II
COMPUTATION TIMES FOR ALL SECURITY INDICES IN THE FULL
MEASUREMENT CASE FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS AND POLISH 2383-BUS
BENCHMARKS.
our method [12] [18]
IEEE 118-bus 0.18s 0.23s 0.24s
2383-bus 29s 29s 33s
Next, (5) is considered when the full measurement assump-
tion is removed. That is, the matrices P1, P2 and P3 in (1)
need not be identities. In this test, the 118-bus system is
considered. In the measurement system about 50% of power
injections and power flows are measured. The measurements
are chosen randomly, and the measurement system is verified
to be observable (i.e., the corresponding H2: has full column
rank (= n)). Since (5) is NP-hard in general, no efficient
solution algorithm has been known. Enumerative algorithms
include, for instance, enumeration on the support of H∆θ ,
finding the maximum feasible subsystem for an appropriately
constructed system of infeasible inequalities [37], and the big
M method to be described. The authors’ implementations of
the first two methods turn out to be too inefficient for the
applications concerned. Therefore, the big M method is used,
which sets up and solves the following optimization problem:
minimize
∆θ , y
∑
j
y( j)
subject to H∆θ ≤ My
−H∆θ ≤ My
H(k, :)∆θ = 1
y( j) ∈ {0,1} ∀ j.
(27)
In (27), M is a user-defined constant. If M ≥ ‖H∆θ ⋆‖
∞
for
at least one optimal solution ∆θ ⋆ of (5), then (27) provides
the exact solution to (5). Otherwise, solving (27) yields a
suboptimal solution, optimal among all solutions ∆θ such that
‖H∆θ‖
∞
≤M. In principle a sufficiently large M can be found
to ensure that the big M method indeed provides the optimal
solution to (5) [38]. However, this choice of M is typically too
large to be practical. In the numerical example in this section,
M is simply chosen to be 104. (27) can be solved as a mixed
integer linear program [39] using solvers such as CPLEX [40].
The solutions by the big M method are treated as references
for accuracy for the rest of the case study. Fig. 6 shows the
(big M) security indices for all chosen measurements.
Alternatively, as described in Section VI a suboptimal
solution to (5) can be obtained by solving (9) exactly using
the proposed method in Section V or the ones from [12], [18].
As explained earlier, (9) can be formulated as Problem 1 with
pi = 1 if and only if the injection measurement at bus vi is
taken and ci j = c ji ∈ {0,1,2} being the total number of line
power flow meters on the line connecting buses vi and v j.
Fig. 7, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively, show the security index
test results with the three Min Cut based methods (i.e., [12],
[18] and the one proposed in this paper). These figures show
only the big M security indices (in light blue, the heights of the
crosses) and the overestimation (in red, the heights between the
crosses and the circles) for the measurements where the Min
Cut based methods do not agree with big M. The case study
indicates that, among the three Min Cut based methods,
the proposed method provides the most accurate suboptimal
solutions to (5). In terms of computation time, the proposed
method is most efficient as suggested by Table III.
TABLE III
COMPUTATION TIMES FOR ALL SECURITY INDICES IN THE PARTIAL
MEASUREMENT CASE FOR THE IEEE 118-BUS BENCHMARK.
our method (s) [12] [18] big M
IEEE 118-bus 0.17s 4.4s 0.21s 118s
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Fig. 6. Security indices for the partially measured 118-bus system. Security
indices are computed using the big M method with M = 104.
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Fig. 7. Security index estimates for the partially measured 118-bus system.
Security index estimates are computed using the method in [12]. The figure
shows only the inexact security index estimates (in circles) and the corre-
sponding ones by the big M method (in crosses).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It has been assumed that the security index problem, formu-
lated as a cardinality minimization problem, cannot be solved
efficiently. This paper formally confirms this conjecture by
showing that the security index problem is indeed NP-hard.
Nevertheless, the security index problem can be shown to be
reducible to a Min Cut with costly nodes problem
(Problem 1) under the full measurement assumption. In this
paper, we show that this problem is equivalent to a standard
Min Cut problem on an auxiliary graph of proportional
size, and can therefore be solved exactly and efficiently using
standard techniques for the Min Cut problem. Under the full
measurement assumption, this allows computing the minimal
number of measurements with which one must tamper in
order to feed incorrect information on the SCADA system
without being detected by a BDD method. The knowledge
of this number can help strategically assigning protection
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Fig. 8. Security index estimates for the partially measured 118-bus system.
Security index estimates are computed using the method in [18]. The figure
shows only the inexact security index estimates (in circles) and the corre-
sponding ones by the big M method (in crosses).
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Fig. 9. Security index estimates for the partially measured 118-bus system.
Security index estimates are computed using the method proposed in this
paper. The figure shows only the inexact security index estimates (in circles)
and the corresponding ones by the big M method (in crosses).
resources (e.g., [9], [41]). Our method also solves a mathe-
matically equivalent problem of robustness of the observability
properties of the system with respect to the failure of some
measurements, assuming again full measurement. It remains to
be determined if the solution could be efficiently approximated
in the general (not fully measured) case. Indeed, even though
our approach already provides an approximate solution to such
general problems we do not know if this approximation comes
with any guarantee of accuracy.
Another interesting issue is the design question: in view of
the exact solution of the security index problem presented in
this paper, could one build efficient design methods in order
to optimize the security index under some natural constraints?
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